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We examine how executive compensation affects the cost of debt financing. Analyzing 
CEO pay data from the UK, we find that debt-like and equity-like pay components have 
opposite effects on the cost of debt. An increase in defined benefit pensions is associated 
with lower bond yield spread, while an increase in executive stock options intensifies it. In 
addition, we find some evidence that cash bonus is negatively associated with the cost of 
borrowing. We do not observe any relation between restricted stock grants and the cost of 
debt financing. Our results suggest that bondholders are fully aware of both risk-taking and 





Keywords: Executive compensation, CEO pay, Cost of debt, Yield spread 





Executive Compensation and the Cost of Debt 
 
Are creditors concerned with executive compensation? In their seminal paper, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that if executive compensation only aligns the interests of shareholders 
and managers (leading to a high pay-performance sensitivity), then there is a strong incentive for 
the managers to expropriate creditors’ wealth by undertaking risky investments. Shareholders 
can award specific compensation to motivate managers towards accepting high risk investment 
projects. This happens primarily due to the convex payoff structure of equity incentives. 
Creditors can benefit from higher executive compensation as long as increased managerial effort 
reduces the probability of firm default. But, they are also more likely to suffer when the 
additional risky investments amplify the firm’s default probability. 
John and John (1993) argue that creditors rationally anticipate the risk-shifting incentive 
coming from executive compensation, and therefore, require a corresponding increase in risk 
premium. Hence, firms that use executive compensation to closely align interests of managers 
and shareholders, are more likely to face a higher borrowing cost. Since the higher cost of 
borrowing is damaging for firms, especially for those requiring additional debt financing, there is 
pressure for a reduction in executive compensation. This means executive compensation should 
be designed to optimize the trade-off between the benefits from risk-shifting and the losses from 
increased borrowing cost. Ortiz-Molina (2007) argues that less incentive compensation for 
managers is deliberately introduced in order to lower the borrowing cost when the conflict 
between shareholders and debtholders is more severe (for example, in highly levered firms). 
In this paper, we empirically study the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation on a firm’s borrowing cost. A few studies have previously examined various 
aspects of the relation between executive pay and cost of debt. Duru, Mansi and Reeb (2005) 
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analyzed the impact of cash bonus, while Ertugrul and Hegde (2008), Devos, Prevost and Rao 
(2008) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) focused on equity compensation. These studies 
focus on a single pay component and relate it to a firm’s cost of debt. However, if lenders 
rationally use executive compensation to assess the impact of agency problems on a firm’s credit 
risk, they should consider not only the size of each pay component separately, but also the 
overall structure of a CEO’s compensation package. The relative proportions of various 
compensation elements may convey additional information about the direction and magnitude of 
risk-taking incentives. Therefore, we examine the effects of all the main components of an 
executive’s pay on the cost of debt.  
We make three key contributions to the extant literature. First, we investigate whether a 
firm’s cost of debt is affected by not only cash-based performance-related pay (bonus) and 
equity-based incentives (stock and option grants), but also by the debt-like pay (defined benefit 
pensions). Although the latter form of executive compensation is ubiquitous and has the potential 
to align the interests of the managers with those of the debtholders, empirical studies rarely 
consider it. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical study to investigate the 
impact of pensions pay component on the cost of debt
1
. 
Second, by splitting executive stock options into two categories (traditional and 
performance-vested stock options), we for the first time empirically examine whether credit 
markets take into account the distinct contractual features of and incentives provided by these 
two types of options. Although most of the literature treats executive stock options as a 
homogeneous variable, there exist, in fact, two distinct categories of stock options: traditional 
                                                 
1
 Wei and Yermack (2009) study the reaction of the bondholders and shareholders to the disclosure of CEO’s 
pensions and deferred compensation. While they provide interesting evidence using the event study methodology for 
a limited sample of firms that disclosed their detailed compensation data, we focus on the market-wide cross-
sectional effects of the pension compensation on the cost of debt. Therefore, our methodology does not depend on 
the assumption that the capital market is unaware of the existence and extent of inside debt prior to the disclosure. 
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stock options and performance-vested stock options (Johnson and Tian, 2000). The former type 
has no specific performance target attached, while the latter requires managers to achieve a 
performance target prior to vesting. Johnson and Tian (2000) find that performance-vested stock 
options (hereafter called PVSO) provide stronger incentives to increase risk as well as stock 
price compared with traditional stock options (hereafter called TSO). We study whether creditors 
consider the award of TSO and PVSO compensation differently and charge a differential risk 
premium. 
Finally, our analysis is a first study that examines the link between CEO pay and the cost 
of debt financing for the UK firms. This provides out-of-sample evidence in addition to the very 
few existing studies that focus only on the United States, and enables us to test whether the 
existing evidence holds for a market with historically different managerial pay structure. 
Our results show that firms awarding their CEOs with higher proportions of defined 
benefit pensions – a liability of the firm that can be viewed as debt-based compensation – 
experience a significant reduction in the cost of debt. On the other hand, we observe that equity-
based compensation, such as stock options, is positively related to corporate bond yield spread. 
Further analysis shows that holdings of performance-vested stock options outweigh traditional 
stock options in terms of increasing the cost of debt. The finding indicates that bondholders see 
performance-vested stock option awarded to managers as a stronger incentive to expropriate their 
wealth by means of risk-shifting. We also find that cash bonus payments to CEOs are weakly 
associated with lower borrowing costs. However, there is no relation between restricted stock 
grants and the cost of debt. Overall, we find that bondholders rationally anticipate risk-taking or 
risk-avoiding incentives of managers by observing different types of compensation awards. 
 4 
 
Hence, a proper adjustment in the structure of executive compensation is an effective way to 
reduce a firm’s cost of borrowing, especially when it relies heavily on external debt financing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. The hypotheses of the study are developed in Section II. The methodology and data 
are described in Sections III and IV, respectively. The empirical results are presented in Section 
V. The final section provides a summary and the conclusions of the study. 
 
I. Literature review 
Executive compensation has mostly been investigated from the viewpoint of firm’s 
shareholders. The idea originates from the agency theory whereby managers are provided 
incentives to work for the creation of more shareholder wealth. In this regard, risk-averse 
managers, who are also interested in job security and their own reputations, will be reluctant to 
take on value-increasing, but risky investment projects. Therefore, by providing appropriate 
equity incentives, managers are expected to be motivated to engage in risky investments. 
Several studies provide empirical support for this theory. Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) find that managerial equity-based pay is linked with several observable risk-taking 
activities, such as investments in research and development, higher leverage and less corporate 
diversification. Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) show that the increased use of option-based 
compensation in the banking industry induces managerial risk-taking. Wu and Tu (2008) provide 
evidence that stock option compensation encourages higher R&D investments by firms. 
Similarly, Sanders and Hambrick (2007) find that the more option compensation CEOs receive 
the more aggressive investments they undertake. In a recent paper, Low (2009) further confirms 
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that higher sensitivity of CEO portfolio value to stock return volatility (vega), associated with the 
equity-based compensation, directly contributes to the managerial risk-taking behavior. 
But, while the shareholders’ interest is being served and agency costs of equity decline 
because of incentive compensation, there can be a corresponding increase in the agency costs of 
debt (John and John, 1993). The reason is that managers might be inclined to choose risky 
investments that will be beneficial to shareholders at the expense of creditors. This phenomenon 
is widely known as the shareholder – debtholder conflict. Obviously, bondholders will anticipate 
this increased risk-taking tendency of managers arising out of incentive pay, and therefore they 
will charge a higher borrowing rate to compensate for any future loss. 
While incentive compensation can hurt bondholders, there exist other types of executive 
compensation that can bring managerial interests in line with those of the firm’s creditors. A 
common but less investigated form of such compensation is executive pensions. Edmans and Liu 
(2010) argue that pension payments to executives can discourage risk-taking activities. By 
aligning managerial interests with those of debtholders, pensions can mitigate shareholder – 
bondholder conflict. 
The empirical examination covering the effect of executive compensation on the cost of 
debt is quite limited. Daniel, Martin and Naveen (2004) observe that the credit spreads of 
corporate bonds increase with both the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility and the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices. However, Ertugrul and Hegde (2008) analyze the 
effect of options granted to outside directors of US firms and find that an increase in option 
compensation decreases yield spreads. Duru, Mansi and Reeb (2005) argue that earnings-based 
bonus can reduce the cost of debt because it motivates managers to seek stable cash flows to 
achieve the earnings target and thereby lower the risk of default. Their results show that the level 
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of CEO cash bonus is indeed negatively related with the bond yield spread. In addition, Gerakos 
(2007) documents a positive relation between bond ratings and CEO pensions pay. 
A few studies provide indirect evidence. Ortiz-Molina (2007) finds that the pay – 
performance sensitivity, defined as the relation between changes in a CEO’s firm-specific wealth 
and the shareholder returns, is lower for firms that issue straight debt whereas it is higher for 
those issuing convertible debts. The finding indicates that firms adopt incentive compensation in 
such way that the shareholder – bondholder conflict can be mitigated. He also finds that option-
based compensation is less attractive for firms suffering from severe shareholder – bondholder 
conflict. Similarly, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) show that firms with higher amount of 
convertible debt offer more options-based compensation to their CEOs. 
If higher incentive compensation aligning shareholder interests with those of managers 
can be detrimental to bondholders, then it should also be reflected in lower bond prices. 
Therefore, instead of directly examining the effect on the cost of debt, several studies investigate 
how bond values are affected by equity-based compensation. Empirical evidence is first provided 
by DeFusco, Johnston and Zorn (1990) who analyze the effect on bond returns when firms 
announce executive stock option plans. They find that stock returns increase while bond returns 
decline with these announcements. Billett, Mauer and Zhang (2010) also document an adverse 
bond price reaction when CEOs receive new equity-based compensation. Wei and Yermack 
(2009) examine how bondholders (and shareholders) react at the disclosure of CEO’s pensions 
and deferred compensation. They find that bond prices rise (and equity prices decline) for firms 
whose CEOs have relatively high pensions. All these studies analyze US data and show that the 
announcement or disclosure of equity-based pay and pensions to CEOs is associated with a 




II. Hypotheses development 
The literature review in the previous section illustrates that executive compensation can 
affect the risk-taking behavior of managers, and subsequently, firm’s cost of debt financing. 
Since each compensation component has its own distinctive feature, their effect on the cost of 




Cash bonus is the first compensation element we consider. It is usually related to an 
accounting performance target. An outcome of such a target is that managers are inclined to 
decrease certain investments in order to lower short-term expenditures and thereby increase the 
reported profit. Since bonus can only be received as long as the firm remains solvent, managers 
are also motivated to generate positive and stable cash flows to be able to meet the financial 
targets. Therefore, it is argued that relatively higher proportion of cash bonus compensation 
would provide more risk-avoiding incentives to CEOs, which may benefit debtholders (Duru, 
Mansi and Reeb, 2005). CEOs with high bonus may therefore face a lower cost of borrowing. 
Our first hypothesis is: 
 H1: Firms providing more cash bonus to their CEOs face a lower cost of debt. 
 
B. Pensions 
Pensions are a special form of compensation because it is deferred and can only be 
accessed upon retirement. In the UK, there are three basic types of pension arrangements: the 
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public social security system, occupational pension and private pension plans. In the 
occupational pension plan, defined benefit pension scheme and defined contribution pension 
scheme are the two basic forms. We focus on the defined benefit pension scheme for top 
managers, because this is the only form of pension that represents a liability of the company to a 
CEO. 
In the defined benefit (DB) pension scheme, the amount of money an employee is 
expected to receive upon retirement is often “defined” in advance. This amount of money is 
based on the number of years of the employee’s service and the final salary when he or she 
retires. Firms are required to regularly contribute certain amount of money into the pension trust 
which is separate from the firm (sponsor) assets. Hence the assets already in the pension trust are 
independent and will not be affected in the event of sponsor’s bankruptcy. The Pension Act of 
2004 introduced further protection for the UK pension scheme. Under this Act, a statutory fund, 
Pension Protection Fund (PPF), was established by the UK government. The PPF is set to pay 
the compensation to the employees if the employer (scheme sponsor) becomes insolvent and the 
pension trust is unfunded (has a deficit). In this case, 100% (90%) of pension compensation, up 
to a certain limit, are guaranteed for the member who is above (under) the normal retirement age.   
However, defined benefit pension plan still presents considerable risk-avoiding incentives 
for executives. As a consequence of the falling equity market, lower interest rates and 
improvements in life expectancy, the DB pension deficit has become increasingly severe among 
the UK blue chip companies. According to the Watson Wyatt pension risk indicators database, 
the average UK FTSE 350 firm had a DB pension deficit of £254 million and funding ratio of 
only 79% in 2004 (Gupta, 2006). In the latest report by Pension Capital Strategies in association 
with JP Morgan, only five of FTSE 100 firms had DB pension surplus during the period of 2007-
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2009 (The Guardian, 19 May 2010). In short, the forces from the pension regulator along with 
the pressure from the huge defined benefit pension deficits may discourage companies from 
pumping the “excess” cash flows into risky investments. 
Secondly, executive managers with defined benefit pension scheme are still the victims in 
the event of bankruptcy. As mentioned before, the Pension Protection Fund guarantees 100% 
(90%) of pension for a member who is above (under) the normal retirement age in the event of 
insolvency. Executives with DB pension plans are not the exceptions. However, there is a cap for 
such compensation. Based on the latest figures from the PPF, in 2010 the maximum 
compensation is £29,748.68 per year, which is negligible compared to the average DB pension 
benefit for top managers of UK firms. In other words, only a tiny fraction of DB pension loss can 
be guaranteed by PPF for executives in the event of insolvency. Compared with normal 
employees, senior managers will suffer much more from the DB pension loss in the event of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, executives with a large amount of DB pensions have strong incentives to 
avoid bankruptcy, even in the presence of a pension protection scheme. 
As a result, a CEO with a defined benefit pension scheme effectively becomes a firm’s 
debt holder. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Edmans and Liu (2010) argue that by aligning 
the interests of managers with other debtholders, pensions can reduce manager’s incentive for 
risk-shifting and lead to the reduction of overall riskiness of the firm and subsequently its cost of 
debt. Therefore, CEOs will be discouraged from taking risky actions which may increase the 
probability of bankruptcy and lower the recovery value. Consequently, we formulate the next 
hypothesis as follows: 




C. Stock options  
A well-established view is that compensation by means of stock options will generate 
strong incentives for risk-increasing investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Guay, 1999). It 
relies on the fact that options have convex payoff structure: the expected payoff will be zero as 
long as the share price is below the exercise price, but it can be quite high if the options are in-
the-money. In addition, the value of options increases when stock return volatility goes up. By 
undertaking risky investment projects, the expected payoff from managerial option holdings 
increases. At the same time, increase in the firm risk will lead to the higher probability of 
bankruptcy and, therefore, lower value of the firm’s debt. Therefore, our hypothesis is that by 
providing a stronger incentive for managers to take more risks, stock option awards will lead to a 
higher cost of borrowing. 
 H3: Firms providing more stock options to their CEOs face a higher cost of debt. 
 
D. Performance-vested versus traditional stock options 
Two types of executive stock options are frequently used as compensation to managers: 
performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) and traditional stock options (TSOs) (Johnson and 
Tian, 2000). These two categories have distinctive features: PVSOs have performance targets as 
vesting condition, while TSOs have no such targets. This difference in vesting conditions may 
provide different incentives for managers. First, PVSOs may generate more risk-taking behavior. 
Because managers cannot exercise options without achieving the performance benchmarks, they 
will be highly motivated to undertake risky investments. Anticipating such risky investment 
tendency, bondholders will require a higher risk premium. 
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Second, earnings are usually used as the main performance benchmarks of PVSOs. The 
use of earnings as a benchmark can motivate managers to engage in opportunistic behavior. 
Kuang (2008) documents that firms providing PVSO-type of compensation to CEOs exhibit 
stronger incentive for earnings management compared with TSO. Prevost, Rao and Skousen 
(2008) link earnings management to the cost of debt and find that earnings management distort 
the quality of earnings that is vital for creditors to assess firm’s default risk. Therefore, by 
observing a higher level of PVSO awards to managers, creditors already anticipate a stronger 
incentive for earnings management and will therefore charge a higher borrowing rate. We 
therefore formulate our next hypothesis as follows: 
 H4: Firms providing their CEOs more PVSOs relative to TSOs face a higher cost of debt. 
 
E. Stock options versus ownership 
Ownership directly links CEO’s personal wealth to the stock price. Compared to stock 
options, the relation between CEO’s wealth invested in firm shares is a linear function of stock 
price rather than a convex one. Hence, the wealth of a CEO with more ownership might be more 
sensitive to the decrease of share price compared to the wealth of a CEO with large stock options 
holdings. As high risk investment may lead to higher return volatility and high possibility of 
price collapse, a CEO with high level of ownership may reduce the risk-taking behavior as his or 
her wealth exposure increases. Analyzing US data, Ortiz-Molina (2006) provides the empirical 
evidence that the cost of debt soars when ownership increase, while such relation disappears 
when ownership reaches very high level. Because of the differences in payoff structures between 
stock options and ownership, we expect that stock option will create stronger incentives for risk-
taking compared to ownership. If the rational debtholders perceive the difference between 
ownership and stock options in terms of risk-taking, they will require a higher risk premium for 
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companies granting their CEOs large number of stock options than for firms with high 
managerial ownership. This leads to our fifth hypothesis: 
 H5: Stock options held by CEOs increase the cost of debt more than ownership. 
 
F. Restricted shares  
The last compensation component we consider is restricted shares. In the UK, most CEOs 
must meet certain prescribed performance target (e.g. total shareholders return) before vesting of 
restricted shares occurs. Hence, CEOs are expected to be motivated to increase the stock return 
in order to guarantee the vesting of restricted stocks. The anticipation of subsequent alignment of 
the interests of shareholders and executives will lead rational debtholders to require a 
corresponding higher risk premium. Therefore, our hypothesis is: 
 H6: Firms providing more restricted shares to their CEOs face a higher cost of debt. 
 
III. Methodology 
We consider both the annual compensation and the cumulative compensation of CEOs. It 
is common knowledge that CEOs receive their compensation in a variety of forms. Each pay 
component received by the CEO during a particular year is taken into account. We construct pay 
variables as a proportion of total CEO compensation, which is the sum of annual salary, bonus, 
the estimated values of stock options and restricted shares, and the pension increment. In 
addition, as a robustness check, we also employ an alternative proxy for annual compensation, 
which is the value of each pay component scaled by total sales of the firm. Previous studies on 
executive compensation did not consider pension element of pay because the information was 
not easily available. However, the disclosure of the pension data is now mandatory, which allows 
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us to collect the full compensation data to accurately estimate each pay component and to 
analyze the impact of pensions. We focus on the defined benefit (DB) pension, as only DB 
pension entitlements are a liability of the firm and therefore represent insider debt. We hand 
collect the actuarial value of the defined benefit pensions as reported in company annual reports. 
Since DB pension value is often reported as an accumulated number, we estimate the amount of 
new pension awarded in a particular year as a year-to-year change in accumulated pension. 
In addition to the annual monetary amounts of compensation, we look at the total amount 
of equity- and debt-like securities accumulated by a CEO during the service. This has potentially 
even stronger implications for company policies, since CEOs are much more likely to be 
motivated by the changes in their total wealth rather than by changes in the value of their annual 
compensation. For stocks and options, we conduct this analysis using the number of equity-based 
grants because the monetary values can vary based on the valuation assumptions. We therefore 
define new compensation variables by considering the number of un-exercisable options, and 
unrestricted (ownership) and restricted stocks held by the CEO as a proportion of total number of 
shares outstanding. These new definitions are also useful to check the robustness of the findings. 
The yield spread of a corporate bond is used to measure the cost of debt. Following prior 
literature (e.g. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008), it is estimated as 
the difference in yield to maturity between a firm’s bond and a UK government bond with a 
comparable maturity. The spread is expressed in basis points.
2
 When a firm has multiple bonds 
outstanding in a year, we use the market value weighted average yield spread. This procedure 
allows us to use a single representative bond yield per firm. 
                                                 
2
 For a few corporate bonds with a maturity longer the longest maturity of government bonds, the yield spread is 
compared with the longest available maturity of the latter. 
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We perform ordinary least squares regressions to measure the effect of pay on the cost of 
debt. The yield spread of corporate bond is used as the dependent variable and the CEO 
compensation components are used as the explanatory variables. Following prior studies 
examining yield spread (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; and Devos, Prevost 
and Rao, 2008), the estimated regression model is written as follows: 
 
Spread i,t  = α0 + β Compensation i,t-1 + ∑ λ Bond Characteristics i,t + 
+ ∑ δ Firm Characteristics i,t + ∑ ζ Industry dummies i,t + ∑ υ Year dummies i,t + εi,t. 
 
The regression specification considers a lagged relationship because bondholders adjust 
the bond price once the information on compensation becomes publicly available. All bond-
specific information is therefore collected three months after the end of a fiscal year.
3
 
Prior literature suggests several bond and firm characteristics that can also influence the 
cost of debt (see, for example, Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; and Devos, 
Prevost and Rao, 2008). These factors are included as control variables in the regressions. The 
bond characteristics are bond rating, duration and bond size. For bond rating variable, we convert 
each rating category into a numerical scale. We assign the lowest rating D a value of 1 and then 
as the bond rating increases the numerical rating changes by an increment of 1 to the value of 22 
for the highest rating Aaa. We further convert this rating into a rating residual to control for all 
information other than compensation that can affect bond rating (spread) and that are not 
captured by other control variables used in the regression. The residual is estimated from the 
regression where the dependent variable is bond rating and the independent variables are the 
                                                 
3
 Most UK firms publish their annual reports within three months after the end of fiscal year. Therefore, all 
compensation information is assumed to be publicly available by this date. 
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various compensation components. The duration of bond is used to control for differences in 
bond maturity and the coupon rate. Bond size is used to control the impact of liquidity on yield 
spread. Large bond size suggests higher liquidity and therefore a lower cost of debt. Following 
Ortiz-Molina (2007), we use the relative bond size instead of absolute bond size. 
The firm characteristics that can affect yield spread include firm size, debt ratio, 
profitability, market-to-book ratio and firm risk. These firm characteristics are found to be 
informative in explaining the cost of debt (e.g. Ortiz-Molina (2007) and Ertugrul and Hegde 
(2008)). The exact definitions of all these variables are presented in the Appendix. The 
regression model also incorporates industry and time factors. 
 
IV. Sample selection and data description 
The sample is selected from non-financial and non-utility UK firms that are covered by 
the Financial Times Stock Exchange All Share Index. To be included in the sample, a firm must 
have a straight bond outstanding. Since the benchmark for calculating corporate bond yield 
spread is corresponding UK government bond yield, we exclude firms with bond issues in 
currencies other than Pound Sterling. The sample firm has on average two bonds outstanding. 
Information on yield spread and other bond characteristics is collected from DataStream. 
CEO compensation data is mainly collected from BoardEx. This database provides 
information on the estimated value of each compensation component. Company annual reports 
are used to collect data on CEO pensions. The sample period of the study is 2003-2006. It starts 
from 2003 because this is the year when firms were first required to publish in their annual 
reports detailed information about CEO pensions. All firm characteristics data are also collected 
from DataStream.  
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The total number of firm-year observations in the sample is 150.
4
 The distribution of the 
sample over years and different industries is presented in Table I. Firm-years steadily increase 
from 31 in 2003 to 44 in 2006. Sample firms are distributed over five main industries as 
identified by the UK SIC code. Manufacturing sector has the highest number of observations 
(39%). It is followed by the wholesale and retail industry (21%). 
(Insert Table I here) 
 
Table II presents descriptive statistics of major variables used in the empirical analysis. 
All data is winsorized at 5% level to limit the impact of extreme values. Panel A provides 
information on bond characteristics. The average (median) spread for traded bonds is 148.37 
(109.56) basis points (over the maturity equivalent government bonds) with a standard deviation 
of 134.65 basis points. The average bond in our sample has duration of about 6.15 years. The 
mean and (median) bond rating is 13.82 (14), which means about half of bonds in our sample 
belongs to the investment grade category (Moody’s rating Baa2). 
 (Insert Table II here) 
 
Descriptive statistics on annual compensation are provided in Panel B of Table II. Each 
type of compensation is expressed as a fraction of total CEO compensation and total sales. The 
mean (median) of total compensation is about £3.29 million (£2.45 million). On average, the 
total amount of pay received by CEO is about 0.13% of total sales. The absolute amounts are 
relatively high because the firms with publicly traded debt are usually the large ones. The CEO 
                                                 
4




of the median firm receives 25.43% of total compensation (about £623 thousands) as salary and 
13.44% (about £329 thousands) as cash bonus. We observe that performance-vested stock option 
grants constitute the major portion of option compensation. Share grants also constitute a 
significant fraction of CEO compensation, which accounts for 28.02% of annual compensation 
on average. Finally, an interesting new finding is the amount of defined benefit pension received 
by the CEO. The annual pension increment is on average 12.43% of total compensation, which is 
equal to about £397 thousands. 
Panel C of Table II provides the information on CEO accumulated compensation. On 
average, CEOs hold un-exercisable traditional stock options (TSO), performance-vested stock 
options (PVSO) and restricted shares for about 0.02%, 0.08% and 0.06% of total shares 
outstanding, respectively. PVSO holdings dominate the accumulated compensation. The ratio of 
CEO pensions to equity compensation is on average 0.37, which is slightly higher than 0.25 
reported by Wei and Yermack (2009) for US firms. CEO’s share ownership information is 
shown in panel D of Table II. We find that on average, CEOs in our sample hold just over half 
percent of firms’ total common shares outstanding. 
Panel E of Table II provides information on sample firm characteristics. The average 
(median) firm in the sample has total assets of £10 (£4) billion. The long-term debt, on average, 
amounts to about 27% of total assets. We find that sample firms have mean (median) 
profitability of 15% (13%) and market-to-book ratio of 1.35 (1.10). 
The correlation matrix between key variables is presented in Table III. We observe that 
bond spread has significant positive correlation with PVSO grants and holding, and with debt 
ratio. It is negatively related with rating, duration, firm size and growth prospects, which is 
consistent with our expectations.  
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(Insert Table III here) 
 
V. Empirical results 
As discussed in Section III, multivariate regressions are estimated to investigate the 
impact of CEO compensation on the yield spread of firms. First, we estimate the full regression 
model with all the pay components included (except for the salary). Since each compensation 
component is scaled by the total compensation, and all the compensation components must add 
up to 1 by definition, we also investigate the robustness of our results by estimating a number of 
regressions dropping out different compensation components sequentially, and finally, 
estimating a regression for each individual pay component separately. OLS results using 
different components of CEO pay are presented in Tables IV to VI. In each table, the column 
besides variable names shows the predicted sign for each of the coefficient estimates. Table IV 
presents the results of our main regressions, estimating the relation between annual 
compensation components (measured as a percentage of the total compensation) and the cost of 
debt. Table V presents the same regressions, employing an alternative measure for the 
compensation variables (compensation as a percentage of sales). Finally, in Table VI we analyze 
the impact of the cumulative compensation (accumulated holdings of options, shares and 
deferred compensation) on the cost of debt. The results of these estimations, grouped by the 
compensation component, are discussed below. 
(Insert Table IV here) 
A. The relation between bonus and the cost of debt  
In Table IV (columns 1 to 4), bonus is measured as the fraction of annual compensation. 
We find that the coefficients of bonus remain negative in all of these pooled regressions. When 
 19 
 
we include all CEO pay components in a regression (column 1), the coefficient for bonus is -1.96 
at the significance level of 10%. Sequentially dropping the option grants and share grants 
variables from the regression (columns 2 and 3) does not affect this result, with the coefficients 
for bonus becoming -1.48 and -1.63 respectively and remaining statistically significant. When 
we test the cash bonus component separately (column 4), the coefficient is still negative, at -1.23, 
with the t-statistics of -1.55. In Table V, we employ the fraction of bonus in total sales as an 
alternative proxy. The regression coefficients for cash bonus (columns 1, 2 and 4) are still 
negative -751.08, -461.06 and -498.13, respectively, although none of them are now statistically 
significant. This difference could be caused by the fact that scaling some pay components (such 
as bonus) by sales does not explicitly take into account their relative importance for a CEO, and 
therefore provides a weaker proxy for our analysis. 
Overall, this analysis provides weak support to our first hypothesis that more cash bonus 
will lower the cost of debt. With more bonus compensation, risk-taking incentive for CEOs is 
reduced to certain extent. As bondholders price the risk-avoiding incentives, we find a negative 
relation between bonus and yield spread. 
(Insert Table V here) 
 
Regarding the control variables, we observe that most of the variables are related to yield 
spread in the expected direction in both Table IV and Table V. The regression coefficients of 
rating residual and firm size in all four regressions are negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level, which means that higher-rated bonds are traded at lower credit spreads. Also as 
expected, the bond size is negatively related to spread, indicating a possible liquidity effect. 
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Larger firms and companies with lower debt ratio have lower cost of debt. Finally, duration, 
profitability, market-to-book ratio, and risk (as measured by the standard deviation of 
profitability) have little impact on the credit spread. 
  
B. The relation between pensions and the cost of debt  
The results of regression analysis of the effects of annual increases to the CEO pension 
benefit on the cost of debt are presented in Tables IV and V. In Table IV, pension is measured as 
the fraction of total compensation. The coefficients for pension pay range from -1.52 (column 2) 
to -1.90 (column 1), all highly statistically significant, in the pooled regressions (columns 1 to 3). 
In column 5, we examine pensions exclusively. The coefficient is -1.38 with the significance 
level of 1%. In other words, a CEO pension increase by 1% as the percentage of annual pay leads 
to a decrease in the cost of debt by 1.38 basis points. 
In Table V, we scale the pension increment by total sales. Similar to the results in Table 
IV, the coefficients for pension (columns 1 to 3) remain negative and significant in all 
regressions. In a separate test (column 5), the coefficient is -634.64 with the significance level of 
10%. It indicates that if the pension increment as the percentage of total sales increases by 1%, 
the bond yield will decrease by 634.64 basis points. 
The evidence provided here strongly supports our hypothesis that deferred CEO 
compensation in the form of company pensions is effective in aligning the interests of CEOs and 
debtholders. The bond market appears to take into account the debt-like elements of CEO pay by 





C. The relation between stock options and the cost of debt  
Both annual option grants (Table IV and V) and total CEO option holdings (Table VI) are 
considered in our study. In Table IV, we measure option grants as a percentage of total 
compensation. When other compensation components are present in a same regression, the 
coefficients for option grants are not significantly different from zero (columns 1 and 2). 
However, when we exclude all other pay components and conduct a separate test including 
option grants only (column 6), the coefficient estimate increases to 1.12, significant at the 5% 
level. This result supports our hypothesis and suggests that when option grants as the percentage 
of total pay increase by 1%, the bond yield will increase by 1.12 basis points. In column 8 of 
Table IV, we further split the total option grants into PVSO grants and TSO grants. Both of the 
coefficients of PVSO and TSO grants remain positive, while only that of PVSO grants reaches 
the significant level. 
Our results from column 6 of Table IV are further corroborated by the estimates 
presented in Table V, where we employ an alternative proxy for option grants. The option grants 
here are measured as the fraction of total sales, and are therefore less likely to be affected by 
other compensation components. In all pooled regressions (columns 1, 2 and 3), the coefficients 
for option grants remain positive and highly significant. In a separate test (column 6), we further 
confirm that more option grants lead to a higher cost of debt. The coefficient is 1229.42 with the 
significance level at 5%. It suggests that if the option grants as the percentage of total sales 
increase by 1%, the bond yield goes up by 1229.42 basis points. The last regression in this table 
(column 8) shows that this result is largely driven by the performance-vested options. While the 
coefficients for both PVSO and TSO grants are positive, only the effect of PVSO grants on the 
cost of debt is statistically significant. 
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We analyze the impact of accumulated equity-like incentives (options and restricted 
shares) on the cost of debt and present the results in Table VI. For comparability of our results to 
the previous studies on the effects of managerial ownership, we also include an unrestricted 
ownership variable, which is not necessarily related to managerial compensation (for example, in 
the case of founder CEOs). As expected, and in line with the previous research, the coefficients 
for option holdings and ownership are positive and highly statistically significant both in pooled 
regressions (columns 1 and 2) and in separate regressions (columns 3 and 4). It further confirms 
that both option holdings and ownership lead to a higher cost of debt, likely by aligning the 
interests of the shareholders and managers. In column (2), we examine whether the increase in 
cost of debt is similar between option holdings and ownership. The coefficient of option holdings 
is 293.65, while that of ownership is only 25.97. The Wald test confirms that the difference 
between these coefficients is statistically significant. Although both ownership and option 
holdings have the same qualitative effects of increasing the cost of debt, the higher managerial 
option holdings are seen by the market as much stronger signal that a CEO will act in the 
interests of the shareholders to the detriment of the debtholders. In column 6 we disaggregate the 
options holdings into PVSO holdings and TSO holdings. Similar to the result in column 8 of 
Table V, both of the coefficients for PVSO and TSO holdings are positive, while only that of 
PVSO is statistically significant. 
(Insert Table VI here) 
 
Finally, we conduct the tests to examine how the performance-vested condition of stock 
options affects bondholders’ risk perception. As mentioned in hypothesis development, we argue 
that PVSO will increase the cost of borrowing more than TSO. One of the reasons is that the 
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performance-vested conditions provide incentives for CEOs to manipulate performance targets 
(in other words, for earnings management) that will lower the true quality of earnings and make 
it more difficult for bondholders to assess firm’s risks. Hence, we expect that bondholders may 
react to PVSO and TSO differently. In column 8 of Table IV, we test the difference between 
PVSO grants and TSO grants. The coefficients of both PVSO and TSO grants are positive and 
similar in magnitude, while only that of PVSO grants reaches statistically significant level. 
However, the Wald test fails to support the hypothesis that the difference between these 
coefficients is statistically significant. We conduct the same test using an alternative definition of 
PVSO and TSO grants in Table V. The results are very similar. 
In Table VI, once again, we disaggregate options holdings into PVSO holdings and TSO 
holdings. Similar to the results in columns 8 of Table IV and Table V, the coefficients of PVSO 
and TSO holdings are positive, but only that of PVSO is statistically significant. The Wald test 
confirms that the difference is meaningful. PVSO holdings outweigh TSO holdings in terms of 
increasing costs of debt. Overall, we find that debtholders are more sensitive to the managerial 
holdings of performance vested stock options (PVSO) compared to the traditional stock options 
(TSO), and thereby require higher rate of return if a company uses more PVSO to compensate its 
managers. This is consistent with our fourth hypothesis, although the markets seem to treat 
annual performance-vested and traditional option grants in a similar way. 
To conclude, the empirical results in this section support three of our hypotheses. Similar 
to the US findings (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2006), we find that if CEOs are granted or own more stock 
options, their firms face higher borrowing costs. Both ownership and options increase the cost of 
debt, but the debtholders require higher premiums for the options component of the pay 




D. The relation between restricted shares and the cost of debt  
The last pay component we analyze is restricted shares. The results are presented in 
Tables IV, V and VI. In hypothesis H6, we argue that restricted shares may increase borrowing 
costs. However, the relation between restricted shares and the cost of debt is not confirmed by 
our results. In all the regressions for equity-like compensation, both annual and accumulated, 
restricted share grants or holdings seem to have no effect on the yield spread. This result is 
consistent across different measures of compensation (Tables IV and V), and is supported by the 
estimates for restricted shareholdings in Table VI. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
the conditions attached to the vesting of such restricted shares explicitly align the interests of the 
managers and bondholders. Alternatively, due to the low likelihood of vesting restricted shares, 
the capital market discounts these as an incentive mechanism. 
 
E. Comparison of the relative impact of the various compensation components on the cost of debt 
Having different compensation components in the same regression allows us to compare 
their relative impact on the cost of debt by comparing their respective regression coefficients. 
We employ Wald test to conduct these comparisons across various pairs of pay components. 
These results are presented in the last rows of Tables IV, V, and VI. The test result presented in 
column 3 of Table IV indicates that while both bonus and pension exert certain debt-cost-
reducing effects, the difference is not significant. Similarly, the test result of column 3, Table V 
shows that the magnitude of increased cost of debt from option grants is not statistically 




F. Firm risk and the effectiveness of debt-like compensation instruments 
One of the main findings of our study so far has been the fact that, while equity-like 
compensation can lead to a higher cost of debt by exacerbating the conflict between the 
managers and debtholders, pensions appear to have the opposite effect, in mitigating this 
conflict. We further investigate the relation between the CEO pensions and the cost of debt by 
taking into account the riskiness of corporate debt. An incentive to reduce the riskiness of the 
debt, provided to a CEO, is most likely to be effective when this risk is sizable enough. For firms 
that already have very low credit risk, the additional incentives provided by executive 
compensation are likely to be less important than for the companies that pay a substantial 
premium to the debtholders to compensate for their credit risk. Therefore, if the negative relation 
that we observe in Tables IV and V between the amounts of debt-like executive compensation 
(pensions) and the yield spread is indeed driven by the incentive effects of executive pensions, 
we should expect that this relation will be stronger for the lower-rated bonds. 
We test this hypothesis in Table VII. In columns 1 and 2, we consider the effects of total 
accumulated pension by employing the pension-to-equity ratio, similar to the measure used by 
Wei and Yermack (2009). As expected, both coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant. The more debt-like wealth (pension) a CEO has relative to his equity holding, the 
more are his interests aligned with those of the debtholders, and the less will be the costs of debt 
financing. In columns 3 to 8, we focus on the effectiveness of pension as a risk-avoiding 
incentive among the lower and higher rated bonds. If pension will provide CEO with risk-
avoiding incentives, such incentives will be stronger when the default risk is high (low bond 
rating). We find that the coefficients for interaction variables of incremental pension and low 
bond rating (columns 3 and 4) and pension-to-equity ratio and low bond rating (columns 5 and 6) 
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are negative and highly significant. This suggests that the incentive effects of pensions, found in 
Tables IV, V and columns 1 and 2 of Table VII, are mostly concentrated among lower-rated, 
riskier bonds. To confirm this, we conduct an analysis on the subsample of 91 firm-years with 
the bond ratings below investment grade. The results are reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 
VII. We find that both pension increment and pension-to-equity ratio have significant negative 
impact on the costs of debt among the lower rated bonds. 
(Insert Table VII here) 
 
Overall, this analysis strongly supports our second hypothesis that higher levels of 
defined benefit pensions lead to a lower cost of debt. This result is likely to be driven by the fact 




In this paper we examine whether and how different executive pay components affect 
firms’ borrowing costs. We expect to observe a negative relation between pay components, 
which generate risk-avoiding incentives, and the cost of debt, and a positive relation between the 
borrowing cost and pay components, which motivate managers to seek risks. 
We consider all four common pay components: bonus, pensions, stock options and 
restricted shares. We take advantage of the extensive compensation disclosure requirements in 
the UK by using the UK data for the period of 2003-2006. Our findings are in general consistent 
with our expectations. 
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First of all, we document that both CEO debt-like compensation (defined benefit 
pensions) and cash bonus reduce borrowing costs. The existence of defined benefit pensions 
makes CEOs the potential debtholders of companies. It naturally aligns the interests between 
CEOs and other debtholders. Therefore borrowing costs are lower for firms which provide more 
defined benefit pensions to CEOs. In addition, the most of this effect is concentrated among the 
lower-rated bonds, where the default risk is the highest and the risk-reducing incentives are the 
most valuable. In the case of cash bonus, its main goal is to motivate managers to focus on short-
term profitability (such as annual earnings). Consequently, it may discourage managers to seek 
long-term risky investment projects. Hence, cash bonus provides certain level of risk-avoiding 
incentives, which we show to be priced by the debtholders. 
Secondly, we find that the companies with high level of stock options granted to the 
CEOs are severely punished by debt markets. Theoretically, stock options and restricted shares 
are expected to link CEO wealth with that of shareholders. This may motivate managers to take 
excessive risks at the cost of debtholders. As a result, higher levels of options and restricted stock 
grants are expected to lead to a higher cost of debt. We find a strong positive relation between 
bond yield spread and CEO option holdings and option grants. Moreover, the effect of stock 
options on bond yields is found to be much stronger than that of managerial ownership. 
However, we do not find evidence that the cost of debt is positively related to restricted stock 
holdings of CEOs. 
Finally, we split stock options into two categories: performance-vested stock options 
(PVSO) and traditional stock options (TSO). We argue that the performance-vested targets on 
stock options may further motivate managers to take excessive risk to meet these targets, which 
will further jeopardize bondholders’ interests. Hence, PVSO should outweigh TSO in increasing 
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the cost of debt. We show that investors do react to performance-vested stock options and 
traditional stock options differently. CEOs with relatively more performance-vested stock 
options holdings face a higher cost of borrowing, which confirms our hypothesis. 
Overall, our study shows that the capital market rationally considers the impact of various 
executive pay components on managerial risk-taking when pricing publicly traded bonds. 
Consequently, optimally adjusting executive compensation structure can be a useful tool in 





Anderson, R., Mansi, S. and Reeb, D., 2003, Founding family ownership and the agency cost of 
debt, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 263–285. 
 
Billett, M., Mauer, D. and Zhang, Y., 2010, Stockholder and bondholder wealth effects of CEO 
incentive grants, Financial Management, Vol.39, pp. 463-487. 
 
Brockman, P., Martin, X. and Unlu, M., 2010, Executive compensation and the maturity 
structure of corporate debt, Journal of Finance, Vol. 65, pp. 1123–1161. 
 
Bryan, S., Nash, R. and Patel, A., 2006, Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the 
changes in executive compensation during the 1990s? Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, 
pp. 516–535. 
 
Chen, C., Steiner, T. and Whyte, A., 2006, Does stock option-based executive compensation 
induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
30, pp. 915-945. 
 
Coles, J., Daniel, N. and Naveen, L., 2006, Managerial incentives and risk-taking, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 79, pp. 431-468. 
 
Daniel, N., Martin, S. and Naveen, L., 2004, The hidden cost of managerial incentives: evidence 
from the bond and stock markets, SSRN Working Paper No. 612921. 
 
DeFusco, R., Johnson, R. and Zorn, T., 1990, The effect of executive stock options plans on 
stockholders and bondholders, Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 617-627. 
 
Devos, E., Prevost, A. and Rao, R., 2008, The structure of executive stock option compensation 
and the cost of debt, SSRN Working Paper No. 1361011. 
 
Duru, A., Mansi, S. and Reeb, D., 2005, Earnings-based bonus plans and the agency cost of debt, 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 24, pp. 431-447. 
 
Edmans, A. and Liu, Q., 2010, Inside debt, Review of Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Ertugrul, M. and Hegde, S., 2008, Board compensation practices and agency cost of debt, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, pp. 512-531.  
 
Gerakos, J., 2007, CEO pensions: disclosure, managerial power, and optimal contracting, SSRN 
Working Paper No. 982180. 
 
Gupta, V., 2006, Pension risk: do employees care, Watson Wyatt Technical Paper. 
 
Guay, W., 1999, The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and 




Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., 1976, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360 . 
 
John, T. and John, W., 1993, Top-management compensation and capital structure, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 949-974. 
 
Johnson, S. and Tian, Y., 2000, The value and incentive effects of non-traditional executive 
stock option plans, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 57, pp. 3-34. 
 
Kuang, Y., 2008, Performance-vested stock options and earnings management, Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 35, pp. 1049-1078. 
 
Low, A., 2009. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 92, pp. 470–490. 
 
Ortiz-Molina, H., 2006, Top management incentives and the pricing of corporate public debt, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.41, pp. 317-340. 
 
Ortiz-Molina, H., 2007, Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of convertible 
debt and straight debt on CEO pay, Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 43, pp. 69-93. 
 
Prevost, A., Rao, R. and Skousen, C., 2008, Earnings management and the cost of debt, SSRN 
Working Paper No. 1083808. 
 
Sanders, G. and Hambrick, D., 2007, Swinging for the fences: the effects of CEO stock options 
on company risk taking and performance, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 50, pp. 1055-
1078. 
 
Sundaram, R. and Yermack, D., 2007, Pay me later: inside debt and its role in managerial 
compensation, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 1551-1588. 
 
Wei, C. and Yermack, D., 2009, Shareholder and bondholder reactions to revelations of large 
CEO inside debt holdings: an empirical analysis, SSRN Working Paper No. 1462475. 
 
Wu, J. and Tu, R., 2008, CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavioral agency 







Panel A: Bond characteristics  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Spread Bond yield spread expressed in basis points over UK Government 
securities (DS:SP). For multiple bonds, market value-weighted average is 
used. 
  
Rating  Bond rating of Moody’s (DS:MRT) converted to a numerical scale, in 
which the lowest rating is 1 and the highest (Aaa) is 22. 
 
Low Rating Dummy variable equals 1 if rating is no more than 14 (Moody’s Rating 
Baa2), the benchmark for “investment grade bond”, otherwise 0.  
 
Rating Residual Residual from the regression where the dependent variable is Rating and 
the independent variables are the relevant compensation components. 
  
Bond Size Relative size of bonds calculated as the market value of bonds (DS:MV) 
scaled by book value of total assets (WC 02999). 
  
Duration  Duration of bonds (DS:DM). For multiple bonds, market value-weighted 




Panel B: Firm characteristics  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of Book value of total assets (WC 02999). 
  
Debt Ratio Book value of long-term debt (WC 03251) scaled by book value of total 
assets (WC 02999). 
  
Profitability Operating income (WC 01250) before depreciation (WC 01151) scaled by 




Market to book value ratio calculated as the book value of total debt (WC 
03255) plus the market value of equity(DS:MV), scaled by book value of 
total assets (WC 02999). 
  




Panel C: CEO compensation  
 









Salary to Sales 
 
Sum of salary, bonus, the estimated values of stock options and 
restricted shares grants, and the pension increment in a particular year 
 
Total Compensation scaled by total sales (WC 01001) 
 
 
Salary scaled by total compensation 
 
Salary scaled by total sales (WC 01001) 
Bonus Cash bonus scaled by total compensation. 
 
Bonus to Sales Cash bonus scaled by total sales (WC 01001) 
 
Incremental Pension Year-to-year change in the actuarial value of defined benefit pension 
scaled by total compensation. 
 
Incremental Pension to 
Sales  
Year-to-year change in the actuarial value of defined benefit pension 
scaled by total sales (WC 01001) 
 
Pension to Equity The total transfer value of defined benefit pension scaled by the 
estimated value of equity holdings (including ownership, restricted 
shares and options) 
 
TSO Grants  Estimated value of traditional stock option grants scaled by total 
compensation. 
 






PVSO Grants to Sales 
 





Estimated value of performance-vested stock option grants scaled by 
total sales (WC 01001).  
 
Option Grants  
 
Option Grants to Sales 
 
The sum of TSO Grants  and PVSO Grants 
 
The sum of  TSO Grants to Sales and PVSO Grants to Sales  
Share Grants  
 
 
Share Grants to Sales 
Estimated value for restricted share grants scaled by total 
compensation. 
 





TSO Holding Number of un-exercisable traditional stock options scaled by total 
number of shares outstanding (DS:NOSH). 
  
PVSO Holding Number of un-exercisable performance-vested stock options scaled by 
total number of shares outstanding (DS:NOSH). 
 




Number of restricted shares held by the CEO scaled by total number of 
shares outstanding (DS:NOSH) 
 
Ownership Number of unrestricted shares held by the CEO scaled by total number 






Table I. Time and industry distribution of sample firms 
 
 








Mining and Quarrying 12 
Manufacturing 59 
Wholesale and Retail 31 
Hotel and Restaurant 8 










Table II. Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 150 firm-year FTSE ALL observations from 2003-2006. Only straight bonds issued 
in GBP sterling are included in the sample. All variables are winsorized at 5% level. 
 
Variables  Mean Median St. Dev. Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Panel A. Bond characteristics     
Spread (Basis Points) 148.37 109.56 134.65 81.70 144.79 
Rating 13.82 14.00 2.41 13.00 15.50 
Low Rating 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Bond Size (%) 1.35 0.85 1.32 0.49 1.99 
Duration (Years) 6.15 5.84 2.68 4.09 7.75 
Panel B. Annual compensation     
Salary (%) 28.05 25.43 14.46 16.65 34.11 
Bonus (%) 15.09 13.44 11.40 7.10 20.40 
TSO Grants (%) 2.33 0.00 9.34 0.00 0.03 
PVSO Grants (%) 14.08 8.91 16.25 0.00 23.72 
Option Grants (%) 16.25 12.59 17.88 0.00 27.72 
Share Grants (%) 28.02 30.00 22.83 0.00 44.72 
Incremental Pension (%) 12.43 0.52 16.86 0.00 24.17 
Total Compensation (£m)  3.29 2.45 2.78 1.38 4.47 
Salary to Sales (%) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Bonus to Sales (%) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
TSO Grants to Sales (%)*10
2 
0.12 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 
PVSO Grants to Sales (%)*10
2 
1.21 0.45 1.84 1.84 1.71 
Option Grants to Sales (%)*10
2 
1.30 0.55 1.87 0.00 1.88 
Share Grants to Sales (%) 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 
Incremental Pension to Sales (%) 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Total Compensation to Sales (%)   0.13 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.13 
Panel C. Accumulated compensation     
TSO Holding (%) 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
PVSO Holding (%) 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.11 
Option Holding (%) 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.12 
Restricted Shareholding (%) 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.08 
Pension to Equity 0.37  0.03 0.55 0.00 0.65 
Panel D. Other equity incentives     
Ownership (%) 0.58 0.03 2.28 0.01 0.13 
Panel E. Firm characteristics     
Firm Size (£bn) 10.42 3.99 1.87 1.92 8.88 
Debt Ratio (%) 26.56 22.74 16.88 13.35 35.68 
Profitability (%) 15.41 13.00 8.39 9.06 19.03 
Market-to-Book ratio 1.35 1.10 0.95 0.75 1.58 
Risk (%) 2.84 1.76 2.98 0.99 3.55 
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Table III. Correlation matrix 
 
Correlations between main variables for 150 observations. Bonus, Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO Grants and PVSO Grants are scaled by 
the total compensation. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The correlations, which are significant at 10% level, are in bold. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1)Spread 1                     
(2)Rating -0.56 1                    
(3)Bond Size -0.01 -0.04 1                   
(4)Duration  -0.25 0.31 0.35 1                  
(5)Bonus -0.07 0.10 0.09 0.11 1                 
(6) Incremental Pension  -0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.30 1                
(7)Pension to Equity -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.27 0.72 1               
(8)TSO Grants 0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.21 -0.09 -0.03 1              
(9)PVSO Grants 0.17 -0.15 0.02 -0.15 -0.21 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 1             
(10)Option Grants 0.19 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13 -0.29 -0.16 -0.11 0.43 0.88 1            
(11)Share Grants -0.17 0.23 -0.18 -0.06 -0.12 -0.34 -0.28 -0.08 -0.46 -0.45 1           
(12)Ownership 0.51 0.01 0.00 -0.17 0.07 -0.14 -0.15 -0.06 0.17 0.12 -0.18 1          
(13)TSO Holding 0.13 -0.02 0.24 0.09 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 0.19 0.20 0.26 -0.12 -0.05 1         
(14)PVSO Holding 0.56 -0.47 0.07 -0.37 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.48 0.44 -0.34 0.28 0.21 1        
(15)Option Holding 0.43 -0.30 0.22 -0.19 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.09 0.46 0.45 -0.31 0.18 0.72 0.80 1       
(16)Restr Shareholding -0.03 -0.07 0.16 0.10 0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.26 0.29 -0.10 0.19 -0.05 0.08 1      
(17)Firm Size -0.32 0.36 -0.51 -0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.09 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.32 -0.18 -0.11 -0.29 -0.26 -0.25 1     
(18)Debt Ratio 0.27 -0.24 -0.23 0.11 0.16 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.23 0.11 0.21 -0.05 -0.18 1    
(19)Profitability -0.11 0.04 0.16 -0.13 0.18 0.03 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.24 0.06 1   
(20)Market-to-Book Ratio -0.31 0.25 0.06 0.03 0.29 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 0.12 -0.17 -0.09 -0.32 -0.28 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.64 1  




Table IV.  Annual compensation and the cost of debt  
 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Bonus, 
Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO Grants and PVSO Grants are scaled by the total compensation. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included, but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  509.03*** 500.04*** 500.07*** 389.08*** 384.18*** 365.28*** 358.30*** 369.21*** 
  (5.19) (5.14) (5.16) (4.45) (4.79) (4.33) (4.47) (4.40) 
Bonus (-) -1.96* -1.48* -1.63* -1.23     
  (-1.79) (-1.67) (-1.98) (-1.55)     
Incremental  (-) -1.90** -1.52*** -1.60***  -1.38***    
Pension  (-2.49) (-2.70) (-3.01)  (-2.74)    
Option  (+) -0.13 0.29    1.12**   
Grants  (-0.15) (0.48)    (2.04)   
Share Grants (+) -0.51      0.21  
  (-0.74)      (0.46)  
TSO Grants (+)        1.34 
         (1.34) 
PVSO  (+)        1.12* 
Grants         (1.91) 
Rating  (-) -17.55*** -16.47*** -16.41*** -22.30*** -24.72*** -21.59*** -24.02*** -21.35*** 
Residual  (-3.32) (-3.24) (-3.25) (-4.75) (-5.49) (-4.59) (-5.29) (-4.52) 
Bond Size (-) -16.07* -16.03* -15.76* -19.48** -19.12** -20.04** -18.45** -20.04** 
  (-1.94) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-2.40) (-2.42) (-2.46) (-2.29) (-2.45) 
Duration (-) -5.08 -5.36 -5.63      
  (-1.30) (-1.38) (-1.47)      
Firm Size (-) -38.62*** -41.48*** -41.00*** -36.44*** -37.51*** -36.89*** -38.50*** -37.37*** 
  (-3.91) (-4.56) (-4.55) (-4.14) (-4.49) (-4.18) (-4.37) (-4.14) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.81*** 1.89*** 1.90*** 1.76*** 1.48*** 1.70*** 1.73*** 1.69*** 
  (3.06) (3.25) (3.27) (3.05) (2.63) (2.97) (3.04) (2.93) 
Profitability (-) 0.09 -0.04 0.13      
  (0.06) (-0.02) (0.09)      
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -17.53 -18.34 -18.81      
  (-1.27) (-1.34) (-1.38)      
Risk (+) -0.03 -0.06 -0.26      
  (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.07)      
Adjusted R
2
   0.47 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.42 
Wald Tests H0: βBonus=βIncremental Pension H0: βTSO Grants=βPVSO Grants 
Chi Square (p-value)   0.00 (0.97)    0.04 (0.84) 
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Table V.  Annual compensation and the cost of debt: Alternative measure 
 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Bonus, 
Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO Grants and PVSO Grants are scaled by total sales. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included, but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  486.18*** 504.77*** 460.00*** 410.07*** 411.50*** 339.60*** 321.87*** 338.80*** 
  (4.27) (4.43) (4.07) (3.93) (4.72) (4.21) (3.70) (4.16) 
Bonus to Sales (-) -751.08 -461.06  -498.13     
  (-1.20) (-0.77)  (-0.88)     
Incremental Pension (-) -625.76* -663.66* -687.25**  -634.64*    
to Sales  (-1.81) (-1.92) (-2.00)  (-1.86)    
Option Grants to  (+) 1208.33** 1128.43** 1104.47**   1229.42**   
Sales  (2.43) (2.27) (2.23)   (2.60)   
Share Grants to Sales (+) 306.33      201.82  
  (1.51)      (1.09)  
TSO Grants to Sales (+)        1272.93 
         (0.64) 
PVSO Grants to Sales (+)        1243.06** 
         (2.52) 
Rating Residual (-) -16.83*** -16.58*** -17.20*** -22.22*** -22.77*** -23.35*** -23.92*** -23.16*** 
  (-3.13) (-3.07) (-3.22) (-4.55) (-4.87) (-5.07) (-5.06) (-5.02) 
Bond Size (-) -22.88** -19.24** -18.53** -18.84** -20.33** -19.61** -21.19** -19.39** 
  (-2.61) (-2.27) (-2.20) (-2.30) (-2.49) (-2.44) (-2.49) (-2.42) 
Duration (-) -3.38 -2.83 -3.79      
  (-0.80) (-0.27) (-0.94)      
Firm Size (-) -44.16*** -43.49*** -39.47*** -40.45*** -41.46*** -34.20*** -34.64*** -34.08*** 
  (-4.15) (-4.07) (-4.23) (-4.03) (-4.61) (-4.08) (-4.04) (-4.01) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.93*** 1.85*** 1.83*** 1.80*** 1.73*** 1.53*** 1.89*** 1.50*** 
  (3.28) (3.13) (3.09) (3.15) (3.05) (2.70) (3.27) (2.62) 
Profitability (-) -0.25 -0.50 -0.38      
  (-0.16) (-0.33) (-0.25)      
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -20.65 -23.28* -22.02      
  (-1.50) (-1.69) (-1.61)      
Risk (+) 0.56 1.57 0.85      
  (0.15) (0.42) (0.23)      
Adjusted R
2
   0.47 0.46 0.47 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.45 
Wald Tests H0: βOption= - βIncremental Pension H0: βTSO grants=βPVSO grants 
Chi Square (p-value)    0.55 (0.46)    0.00 (0.99) 
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Table VI.  Accumulated equity incentives, ownership and the cost of debt  
 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on accumulated equity incentives and ownership for 150 observations. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included, but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Intercept  123.66 125.97 270.10*** 377.65*** 472.11.*** 339.15*** 
  (1.37) (1.47) (3.51) (4.78) (5.33) (4.22) 
Ownership (+) 25.99*** 25.97*** 26.18***    
  (6.96) (7.00) (6.86)    
Option Holding (+) 293.17*** 293.65***  346.28***   
  (4.23) (4.67)  (4.77)   
Restricted Shareholding (+) 10.47    -40.49  
  (0.09)    (-0.28)  
TSO Holding (+)      153.20 
       (1.24) 
PVSO Holding (+)      460.57*** 
       (4.57) 
Rating Residual (-) -24.05*** -24.04*** -20.80*** -15.86*** -13.09** -11.05** 
  (-5.02) (-5.04) (-4.27) (-3.10) (-2.38) (-2.20) 
Bond Size (-) -15.60** -15.57** -13.74* -23.51*** -21.28** -20.04** 
  (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.89) (-3.05) (-2.54) (-2.60) 
Duration (-) 0.04 0.07     
  (0.01) (0.02)     
Firm Size (-) -9.21 -9.29 -21.94*** -32.26*** -40.93*** -28.89*** 
  (-1.14) (-1.16) (-2.79) (-3.98) (-4.76) (-3.55) 
Debt Ratio (+) 2.09*** 2.09*** 2.38*** 1.75*** 2.21*** 1.89*** 
  (4.12) (4.21) (4.56) (3.08) (3.60) (3.41) 
Profitability (-) 1.43 1.44     
  (1.09) (1.11)     
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -30.82*** -30.99*** -26.51*** -19.13* -32.12*** -16.36 
  (-2.63) (-2.70) (-2.94) (-1.92) (-3.99) (-1.63) 
Risk (+) 4.95 4.91     
  (1.57) (1.58)     
Adjusted R
2
   0.62 0.63 0.55 0.48 0.39 0.50 
Wald Tests H0: βownership=βOption Holding H0: βTSO Holding=βPVSO Holding 
Chi Square (p-value)  15.02*** (0.00)    3.08*(0.08) 
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Table VII.  Pensions, credit quality and the cost of debt 
 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The last two columns are estimated only for the observations with low bond ratings. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are 
included, but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Intercept  453.58*** 425.00*** 495.63*** 440.59*** 457.18*** 346.18*** 947.41*** 955.89*** 
  (4.80) (5.15) (5.49) (6.00) (4.94) (5.02) (5.85) (5.73) 
Incremental Pension (-)   1.92* 2.06**   -1.67***  
    (1.93) (2.10)   (-2.77)  
Pension to Equity (-) -34.99** -37.93*   33.06 46.46  -46.64** 
  (-2.13) (-2.34)   (1.05) (1.50)  (-2.32) 
Low Rating* (-)   -4.00*** -4.12***     
Incremental  Pension    (-3.66) (-3.82)     
Low Rating*Pension to Equity (-)     -88.61** -106.6***   
      (-2.52) (-3.10)   
Rating Residual (-) -17.62*** -21.43*** -20.24*** -20.86*** -20.22*** -25.84*** -25.90*** -26.72*** 
  (-3.13) (-4.37) (-3.79) (-3.96) (-3.60) (-5.38) (-3.52) (-3.51) 
Bond Size (-) -16.12* -20.00** -12.55  -12.72  -15.13 -14.82** 
  (-1.94) (-2.53) (-1.59)  (-1.54)  (-1.25) (-1.19) 
Duration (-) -6.07  -1.67* -8.24** -5.19  -22.41*** -22.67*** 
  (-1.52)  (-1.70) (-2.32) (-1.32)  (-3.91) (-3.86) 
Firm Size (-) -36.39*** -37.07*** -43.16*** -36.95*** -39.56*** -32.32*** -85.62*** -86.40*** 
  (-4.09) (-4.43) (-5.01) (-5.17) (-4.49) (-4.42) (-5.49) (-5.37) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.83*** 1.69*** 2.06*** 2.03*** 2.01*** 1.83*** 3.40*** 3.45*** 
  (3.05) (2.87) (3.64) (3.64) (3.39) (3.12) (4.30) (4.21) 
Profitability (-) -0.33  0.41  -0.04  -5.85** -6.51** 
  (-0.22)  (0.28)  (-0.02)  (-2.35) (-2.53) 
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -22.70* -21.25** -27.29** -27.25*** -23.89* -22.52** -16.99 -14.93 
  (-1.64) (-2.05) (-2.07) (-2.71) (-1.76) (-2.20) (-0.72) (-0.61) 
Risk (+) 0.62  -0.86  -0.01  -1.85 -1.40 
  (0.17)  (-0.25)  (-0.02)  (-0.33) (-0.25) 
No. of obs.  150 150 150 150 150 150 91 91 
Adjusted R
2
   0.45 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.60 0.58 
 
